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Abstract
Peer to peer financial marketplaces provide a platform for individual lenders and borrowers to interact and 
transact. These marketplaces disintermediate the traditional financial services business models. In this 
exploratory paper we study the operation and effectiveness of one such marketplace: Prosper.com. We 
analyze six months of lender, borrower and loan repayment data to answer preliminary research questions 
about lender behavior, market effectiveness and antecedents of loan default. We show that lenders mostly 
behave rationally and charge appropriate risk premiums for antecedents of loan default. We also show that 
there are mismatches between risk premiums charged and relative importance of factors that drive loan 
default. We then explore the dynamic process of lenders adjusting their lending strategies to reduce these 
mismatches. We analyze the effectiveness of the group reputation used in the marketplace and show that it 
is not effective in promoting good borrower behavior. Our analysis provides a base for future research in 
this exciting and evolving context. Our results provide directions for practice applications as well as future 
research in design of financial marketplaces, investing and risk mitigation strategies and improving the 
effectiveness of peer-to-peer financial marketplaces.
Keywords: Peer-to-peer, financial marketplace, e-commerce, prosper.com,
Introduction
Internet and the digital economy have transformed the financial services industry. The first era of Internet-led transformation 
was led by lower transaction cost that allowed transaction volumes to increase and provided banks and other financial 
services firms like Charles Schwab with cheaper channels to reach customers. However, the impact of Internet on financial 
services industry is taking a larger shape than just lowering of transaction cost. Clemons, Hitt et al (2002) argue that the three 
main impact of Internet and e-commerce on financial services industry are disintermediation, differential pricing and 
transparency. Malone, Yates, and Benjamin  (1987) argue that increasing use of IT will lead to an overall shift toward the use 
of electronic markets rather than hierarchies to coordinate economic activity. As the cost of communication and searching 
other participants of the electronic markets reduce, it becomes feasible for individuals to transact on the market rather than 
going to a firm. The “old” Internet was all about reducing communication and transaction cost which led to formation of 
large B2B and B2C electronic marketplaces. However, the “new” Internet or Web2.0 allows individuals to collaborate and 
harnesses the collective intelligence and decision making power of a large group of individuals (Oreillynet.com 2007). This 
reduces the searching cost associated with finding other members of C2C electronic markets and makes C2C markets more 
viable. Peer to peer financial marketplaces are a result of this growing trend towards Web2.0 enabled C2C electronic markets. 
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In traditional business model of a bank, the bank acts as the aggregator and manager of deposits and loans. Banks 
take deposits from individuals at a lower interest rate and lend the money to others at a higher interest rate. The difference 
between the two interest rates, called the spread, is the main source of bank’s income. For example – a recent sample of 
prevailing interest rates indicate that while prime lending rate for banks is 8.25% (Bankrate.com 2007b), the deposit rate for a 
1 year deposit is only 4.8% (Bankrate.com 2007a), giving the bank a spread of 3.25% even for the prime borrowers. Peer to 
peer financial marketplaces allow lenders (individuals who deposit) and borrowers to interact, transact and take a share of the 
spread. Recent loans to quality borrowers at a peer to peer financial marketplace carried an average interest rate of only 
7.79% (Prosper.com 2007a), which is lower than the prime rate, indicating that the marketplaces are allowing the borrowers 
to get a share of the spread which would otherwise have gone to the bank.
Peer to peer financial marketplaces have alternately been called “the eBay for loans” (Hof 2006; Pearlstine 2006). 
Borrowers list their requirements and the maximum interest rate they would be willing to pay and lenders then bid on the 
loan listings. If there is sufficient interest in the listing then the loan interest rate is bidded down and the loan is finalized at 
the market clearing interest rate. The marketplace works as the platform provider and takes a commission from the borrowers 
and the lenders. The essential concept of peer to peer financial marketplaces has also been extended towards charitable 
lending or “social lending”. For example: Kiva.org provides a platform for individuals to lend interest free to entrepreneurs in 
developing countries (Kiva.com 2007). Although profit oriented marketplaces like Prosper.com, where lender’s have an 
opportunity to get attractive returns, have also been sometimes clubbed together with marketplaces solely devoted to social 
lending (Vanderkam 2006), in this paper we have assumed that lenders are working for profit motive and are trying to 
maximize their returns for the given risk profile of their investment. Informal discussions with lenders at Prosper.com support 
the assumption.
The first peer to peer financial marketplace in the US, Prosper.com, was established on Feb 13, 2006. Since then the 
platform has witnessed rapid growth and now has more than 8000 loans with total loan origination of over $41 million. 
Prosper.com boasts of more than 180,000 registered users and currently clocks more than $6 millions in new loans every 
month (Prosper.com 2007b). 
Peer to peer financial marketplaces are in their early stages of evolution and corresponding lender and borrower 
behaviors in the marketplace are still evolving. This presents a unique opportunity for Information Systems researchers to 
study novel organizational forms and business models, design of such platforms and their effect on borrower and lender 
behaviors; and finally, transformative impact of such technology led disintermediation on wider financial services industry. 
In this paper we present an exploratory analysis of one peer to peer financial marketplace, Propser.com, to provide the 
foundation for future research on this phenomenon. We analyze six months of lender, borrower and loan repayment data 
collected from Prosper.com to analyze the following preliminary research questions:
- Do lenders follow rational lending practices while lending on the marketplace? That is, what factors affect their 
lending strategy and whether they are in line with rational expectations?
- Do lenders follow efficient lending practices while lending on the marketplace? That is, what are the 
antecedents of loan default and whether lenders charge appropriate risk premiums for factors that drive loan 
defaults?
- What is the impact of group reputation systems on borrower and lender behavior? (more information on group 
reputation system used by peer to peer financial marketplaces are provides in later sections)
- Is the marketplace evolving to achieve higher lending efficiency? That is, are lenders adjusting their lending 
strategies and charging appropriate risk premiums as more information becomes available on antecedents of 
loan defaults and the relative importance of these factors that drive loan defaults?
The above research questions address the fundamental questions about the evolution and the effectiveness of peer to peer 
financial marketplaces in a rigorous empirical setting. They establish the baseline demonstrating rational basis for their 
operations and uncover unique facets of these marketplaces. More importantly, they form the basis for future research with 
more complex relationships and richer constructs in a novel context in early stages of its evolution. This research is also 
relevant for practice as it provides directions for optimal design of such marketplaces and the associated group reputation 
systems and uncovers antecedents of borrower and lender behavior in these marketplaces that can be used for assessing future 
scalability and efficiency of the market, devising investment strategies and risk mitigation approaches etc.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section provides details of how peer to peer financial 
marketplaces work with specific example of Prosper.com. Then we discuss prior literature relevant to the study followed by 
development of exploratory hypotheses and propositions. We then present the data used for the analysis and describe the 
preliminary results. Finally we discuss the results, their implications and the limitations of the study.
How Peer-to-Peer Financial Marketplaces Work?
We will use Prosper.com as the typical (and currently the only available example in the US) example of a peer to peer 
financial marketplace. The service is essentially positioned as an eBay style loan marketplace. Prosper matches people who 
need small loans, but can't get them from traditional banks (or get them from traditional banks at higher interest rates than 
those available at the marketplace), with willing lenders. It is the first such peer to peer financial marketplace in US; although 
Zopa.com provides a similar service in Britain. BusinessWeek (Hof 2006) explains Prosper.com’s working as follows: 
People who want a loan of up to $25,000, put it up for bid at a maximum interest rate they're willing to pay. Although they 
can remain anonymous to everyone but Prosper and regulatory authorities, they must submit to having their credit record 
checked and their credit grades displayed on their listing. They also must provide details of their annual income for 
calculating their debt to income ratio. Lenders bid in increments starting at $50, usually just for a portion of the loan. Prosper 
provides borrowers and lenders information on standard interest rates and default rates associated with the various credit 
rating levels, so they can make judgments about reasonable payments and risk levels. When the listing ends, the bids with the 
lowest rates are combined to produce a single loan that's repaid over three years. Prosper draws payments from the borrower's 
bank account and sends them monthly to the various lenders' accounts. Prosper charges borrowers a fee equal to 1% of the 
funded loans, as well as a 0.5% annual loan-servicing fee to lenders. 
If a borrower fails to pay, Prosper refers the loan to collection agencies chosen by lenders. Prosper has also 
implemented a group membership system that attempts to introduce collective reputation for borrowers. People can form 
groups of borrowers whose collective repayment record is made public. It is expected that people will be less likely to default 
if they know their delinquency will hurt a group of people they know, and that the group leaders will be inclined to make sure 
members don't miss payments. Group leaders get cash incentives when a loan is repaid in time. Group leaders can choose to 
keep or share rewards with the borrowers. If a borrower defaults then it is reported to the credit agencies.
Expected Lender Behavior
We expect lenders to be rational profit maximizers. Specifically, we expect that after controlling for interest rate and loan 
amounts lenders will bid more for listings that have characteristics indicative of higher credit quality and lower risk of 
default. We can formalize this argument in the form of the following proposition:
Proposition 1: Lenders will bid more for loan listings with higher credit quality for the same level of risk.
We can further specify the proposition in form of testable hypotheses as follows. The very first indication of credit risk of a 
borrower is the credit grade assigned to the borrower based on the information in borrower’s credit file. Hence, lenders are 
expected to bid more for loan listings with higher credit grade. Then, the borrower’s debt to income ratio represents the 
borrower’s ability to pay back the loan. Hence lenders are expected to bid more for loan listings that have lower debt to 
income ratio. Finally, owing a home and having a verified bank account points towards financial stability and good financial 
management on the part of the borrower. Hence, lenders are expected to bid more for loan listings with verified bank 
accounts and loan listings from borrowers that are also homeowners. Hence, we can posit the following:
Hypothesis 1A: Lenders will bid more for loan listings with higher credit grade
Hypothesis 1B: Lenders will bid more for loan listings with lower debt to income ratio
Hypothesis 1C: Lenders will bid more for loan listings with verified bank accounts
Hypothesis 1D: Lenders will bid more for loan listings from borrowers that are also homeowners
Trust is a major determinant of people’s behavior in online marketplaces (Hoffman, Novak et al. 1999). The amount 
of trust lender’s place on the borrowers is affected by the amount of information that borrower’s provide about themselves. 
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Borrowers provide optional information about themselves and their plan for paying back the loan in the description field. 
Such information can include income, expense, budget, purpose of taking the loan, explanation of negative items on the 
credit report etc. Lenders are expected to place more trust on borrowers that provide more information. Hence, we can posit:
Hypothesis 2: Lenders will bid more for loan listings with more information in the listing description
Reputations systems are used to encourage trust formation in online transactions (Resnick, Kuwabara et al. 2000). 
Peer to peer financial marketplaces use a group reputation system. Borrower’s position in the reputation system is another 
source of information and trust for the lender. First, borrowers that are part of a group and have gone through the group 
membership process and are accountable to the group leader are expected to be more careful about repaying their loan in 
time. Further, borrowers that have received endorsements from group leaders are also expected to be better credit risk as the 
group leader has recommended them after personal interaction with them and have found them worthy of confidence. Hence, 
we can posit the following two hypotheses about the impact of the reputation system on lender’s bidding behavior:
Hypothesis 3A: Lenders will bid more for loan listings from borrowers that are member of a group
Hypothesis 3B: Lenders will bid more for loan listings that have been endorsed by the group leader
The hypotheses above expect the lenders to behave in a rational way and bid more for loan listings that are 
perceived to be lower credit risk for the given credit quality. However, financial marketplaces are dynamic environment 
where lenders can observe the success (i.e. repayment of the loan principal with designated interest) or failure (i.e. loan 
default) of their loans and adjust their lending strategies for future loans to minimize the level of default for a given interest 
rate. For example, if lenders observe that loans from borrowers that are homeowners have a higher rate of default then they 
will charge a higher interest rate (i.e. risk premium) for such loans in future. Similarly, if lenders observer that borrowers that 
belong to a group or have group leader’s endorsement have lower rate of default then they would willing to charge a lower 
interest rate for such loans. Thus, we expect that in the dynamic lending environment of peer to peer financial marketplaces, 
where lenders have an opportunity to learn and adjust their expected risk premiums, lenders will charge higher risk premiums 
for loan listings that are associated with factors that drive loan default. Hence we propose the following:
Proposition 2: Lenders will charge higher risk premiums for factors that drive loan default rates
We are not formalizing the proposition above as hypotheses in this paper as we can not rigorously test the above 
proposition with the current dataset available. However, we will explore whether the above proposition holds in a descriptive 
way through empirical analysis. Further, if there is any mismatch between the relative importance of a factor as an antecedent 
of loan default and the corresponding risk premium charged for that factor, we can expect that lenders will learn and adjust 
their bidding strategy such that the mismatches will be reduced with time. The current paper presents the view of the 
marketplace in one point in time and does not include time series analysis. Hence we are not hypothesizing the dynamic 
adjustment of risk premiums in this paper. The time series analysis is under progress and we expect to present its results in 
the conference.
The proposition above represent the market’s ability to appropriately match antecedents of default risk with 
corresponding risk premiums, which can be taken as a measure of market effectiveness. If peer to peer financial marketplaces 
can satisfy the above hypotheses with a lower cost of operation than the traditional business model of financial services, then 
we can expect these marketplaces to be competitive in the long run. 
Data
Data for this study was collected from Prosper.com over six months. First stage of data collection was done using automated 
spider programs. These spider programs systematically access individual web pages, download the HTML code of the pages 
and then process the HTML code to extract relevant information into a local database. Previous research has pointed out 
several pitfalls, such as inconsistent data and missing data, of using spiders for extracting information (Crowston and 
Howison 2004). We employed safeguards in the spider code to maintain data integrity. We also manually verified parts of the 
spider output to make sure that the output was correctly parsed. Data collected using Spiders was then combined with 
proprietary data released by Prosper.com about financially sensitive information like loan defaults which are not available 
through public webpages.
Kumar Empirical Analysis of Peer to Peer Financial Marketplaces
5
For six month of Prosper.com’s operations between July to December 2007, we collected listings, bidding and loan 
repayment information. Following are the main data items collected:
• Listing Data: Information about loan listings posted by borrowers on Prosper.com
- Amount Requested: Amount of loan requested by the borrower
- Date of Listing: We used the date of listing information to create dummy variables to control for time.
- Borrower’s Credit Grade: Prosper.com uses a letter grade credit rating system which has the following grades 
from higher to lower credit: AA, A, B, C, D, E, HR, NC. HR refers to “High Risk” and NC refers to “No Credit 
Information Available”. We have coded the credit grades to numerical scores from 1 (good credit) to 7. NC 
credit grades were excluded from the analysis.
- Borrower’s Debt to Income Ratio: Ratio of borrower’s total debt (including the proposed Prosper.com debt) 
and total income from all sources.
- Listing Title and Description: Borrower’s can include a title and a description in their loan listings to better 
convey the merits of their listing to the lenders. The description field is used to create a “Description Length” 
variable to indicate the amount of information contained in the description field.
- Group Membership: Whether the borrower is a member of a group.
- Group Leader Endorsement: Endorsement by the group leader including document and identity verification.
- Group Leader Reward Rate: Percentage commission received by the group leader if the loan is successful.
- Account Verification: Binary variable indicating whether the borrower has a verified bank account
- Homeowner Verification: Binary variable indicating whether the borrower is a homeowner
• Lender Data: Information about bids made by lenders and the resulting final status of the loan
- Amount Funded: Amount for which bids were received from lenders for a listing
- No of Bids: Total number of bids received from lenders for the listing
- Final Loan Interest Rate: Final interest rate applicable for the loan. This rate will be lower if lender interest is 
high and larger number of bids are received for the listing
- Listing Status: Final status of the listing – funded, expired or withdrawn. We have encoded this as a binary 
variable where 1 means that the listing is successful (status is funded) and 0 means that the listing is 
unsuccessful (status is either withdrawn or expired).
• Loan Repayment Data: Information about the loan repayment history
- Loan Status: Current status of loan repayment. This can be current or in various stages of late payment/default. 
We have coded it as a binary variable where 1 means that the loan has defaulted or gone bad (status other than 
current) and 0 means that the loan is being repaid in time and is in good standing (status current).
The dataset consists of more than 25,000 loan listings and close to 4,000 loans. This provides a large and rich dataset to test 
the hypotheses presented before.
Methodology and Results
For testing hypotheses 1 through 3, we have taken the number of bids received by a listing as the dependent variable. We 
have controlled for factors that may affect lender behavior such as listing duration, title length, month of listing as well as 
basic risk reward factors like interest rate and amount requested. As the dependent variable is a continuous one, an Ordinary 
Least Square analysis is sufficient. We checked for usual violations of OLS assumptions and found the model to be 
satisfactory. Results of the OLS model are summarized in the table below:
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Hypothesis Description Supported
1A Higher Credit Grade → Higher No of Bids Yes
1B Lower Debt to Income Ratio → Higher No of Bids No
1C Verified Bank Accounts → Higher No of Bids Yes
1D Homeowner → Higher No of Bids No
2 Listing Description Length → Higher No of Bids Yes
3A Group Membership → Higher No of Bids No
3B Group Leader Endorsement → Higher No of Bids Yes
Figure 1: Summary of Hypotheses Testing
While we see that only some of our expectations about rational behavior by lenders in the peer to peer financial 
marketplace are empirically supported, this may be due to the fact that the marketplace is dynamic and lenders adjust their 
lending strategies to reflect appropriate risk premiums for the “actual” antecedents of loan defaults in the marketplace 
(Proposition 2). While we can not rigorously test proposition 2 with the current dataset, we can descriptively explore the 
argument using two empirical models. The first model uses the actual defaults data to discover the antecedents of loan 
default. The second model takes the actual interest rates charged by lenders as dependent variable and various potential 
antecedents of loan default as explanatory variables. Thus, this model represents the “actual risk premiums” charged by 
lenders for various antecedents of loan default. A comparison of the two models can provide us with descriptive evidence for 
or against proposition 2.
Figure 2 below summarized the results of the empirical models used to explore the impact of various potential 
antecedents of loan default on the probability of loan default and on the interest rates charged for the loans. Comparison of 
the direction and significance of the two effects provides information about whether lenders are charging appropriate risk 
premiums. For example: the first row indicates that higher loan amount leads to higher probability of loan default and also 
higher interest rates charged and both of these effects are statistically significant. This shows that lenders recognize the risks 
of a loan with higher loan amount and appropriately charge higher risk premiums.





Loan Amount Higher Higher Appropriate
Debt to Income Ratio Not Significant Higher Not Appropriate
Description Length Not Significant Not Significant Appropriate
Credit Grade Lower Lower Appropriate
Whether Account Verified Lower Not Significant Not Appropriate
Whether Homeowner Not Significant Lower Not Appropriate
Group Membership Higher Higher Appropriate
Group Leader Endorsement Not Significant Lower Not Appropriate
Figure 2: Antecedents of Loan Default and Corresponding Risk Premiums
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The results presented above in Figure 2 show that lenders charge a positive risk premium for amount of loan, debt to 
income ratio and group membership. Lenders charge lower interest rates (negative risk premium) for higher credit grade, for 
being a homeowner and for being endorsed by the group leader. Lenders do not consider having a verified account and the 
length of description as having a significant impact over the risk of default as these factors have no significant impact on 
interest rates charged. 
We can immediately see that risk premiums being charged are in the same direction as expected for amount funded 
and credit grade. However, lenders give interest risk discounts for being a homeowner and for having group leader 
endorsements even though they have no significant impact on the probability of loan defaults. Further, lenders charge 
significant risk premiums for higher debt to income ratio while it also does not have a significant impact on loan default. 
Interestingly, we find that lenders have recognized (in contrast to our rational expectation hypotheses 3A) that group 
membership actually leads to higher defaults are hence charging a positive risk premium for that. We can conclude that there 
is mixed descriptive empirical evidence for proposition 2. We expect to develop the proposition into testable hypotheses, 
rigorously test the hypotheses and present the results in the conference.
We see that lenders have adjusted their bidding behavior to take care of some antecedents of loan defaults but some 
others are not being given appropriate risk premiums. As the marketplace is a dynamic process, lender’s adjustment of their 
strategy is a dynamic evolving process and we can expect that with time lenders will narrow these mismatches. 
Discussion and Conclusion
We have presented the first empirical analysis of the operations of peer to peer financial marketplace in this paper. We have 
explored two simple but very important arguments: first, are market participants behaving rationally in the marketplace and 
second, is the market successful in effectively matching antecedents of loan defaults with appropriate risk premiums. We find 
that lenders are indeed behaving rationally for the most part and bidding more for listings that are expected to be lower risk. 
We also observe that lenders are not behaving rationally for some elements (example: group membership) and find that the 
answer lies in the expected risk premiums based on actual default experience. As group membership is associated with higher 
defaults hence lenders attach a higher risk premium to it and bid less. Thus, we find evidence that peer to peer financial 
marketplaces are operating as expected from a rational profit motive. However, the study also demonstrates that there are 
definitive weaknesses in the effectiveness of the marketplace to match antecedents of loan default with appropriate risk 
premiums. We expect that a time series analysis of dynamic adjustment of lender’s risk premiums with throw more light on 
whether the market is successful in learning over time and reducing the mismatch. 
Future lines of enquiry in the context of peer to peer financial marketplaces can include dynamic adjustment of 
lending strategies, impact of various information elements in listing description, impact and effectiveness of the unique group 
reputation system, emergence of trust etc.
The results of this paper are also relevant for practice. From a design of the marketplace platform point of view, we 
show the elements which are significant in lender’s decision making and borrower’s default rates. These factors are an 
essential part of the platform and should continue to be included. Other factors which are not significant do not add to the 
effectiveness of the platform and can be discontinued or modified. Further, the effectiveness mismatches discovered in 
analysis of proposition 2 can point towards future revision of the marketplace platform for improving effectiveness. These 
mismatches can also provide directions for devising investment strategies which exploit the mismatches to generate higher 
returns than the market average.
Our results also point towards the inadequacy of the current group reputation system being used. Essentially a group 
reputation system should encourage good behavior by borrowers which will in turn be rewarded by lenders (Resnick, 
Kuwabara et al. 2000).We note that group membership actually leads to lower bidding and higher interest rates as it increases 
the risk of defaults. Further, we observed that even though group leader endorsements provide lenders with enhanced trust 
and they ask for lower interest rates for such loans, the endorsements in fact have no significant impact on the default risk. 
Thus, we can conclude that the current group reputation system is not effective currently and needs to be modified.
The current research has many limitations. First of all, as this is a preliminary and exploratory analysis, the research 
does not have a strong theoretical background. We expect that as we progress towards studying specific elements of the 
marketplace, we would be able to leverage specific theoretical groundings to do a more robust and theoretically grounded 
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analysis. The data used is also limited as we are unable to conduct an extensive time series analysis of lender behavior with 
the current data. Many variables used in this study are also simpler and can be made richer. For example – we have only 
considered the “quantity: of information provided in description length and not the quality or content of the description. We 
have collected more extensive dataset of Prosper.com and are in process of rectifying these limitations. 
Peer to peer financial marketplaces are an exciting new development in the continuing transformation brought about 
by the digital technologies. These marketplaces are rapidly growing and provide Information System researchers a unique 
opportunity to study the evolution and effectiveness of such marketplaces. As the first study to rigorously analyze this 
phenomenon, we believe that this research makes important contributions to both research and practice. We hope that future 
research with further extend its contributions and rectify the limitations. 
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